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CLAIMS ARISING: THE ONEIDA NATION OF WISCONSIN
AND THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, 1951-1982
Karim M Tiro*
I. Introduction
The Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin is one of three Oneida tribes' today
whose members trace their descent to the Oneida tribe that existed in present-
day New York State when the first Europeans arrived, and constituted one of
the Five (later Six) Nations of the Iroquois League. The Wisconsin Oneidas
were a party to multiple claims before the Indian Claims Commission (ICC),
usually as co-plaintiffs with other tribes, including other Oneidas.2 These
claims ranged widely across the spectrum of issues the Commission
considered; in addition to their claims involving land ceded by treaty, the
Wisconsin Oneidas were among the small number of tribes who filed
accounting and mismanagement claims
An overview of the Wisconsin Oneidas' ICC claims provides a broad tour
of the Commission's areas of activity as well as a glimpse of tribes' turbulent
experience in the century following the American Revolution. Furthermore,
the Commission's legacy is dramatically illustrated by the relationship
* Associate Professor of History, Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. Ph.D., History,
1999, University of Pennsylvania, B.A., 1991, Drew University. The author wishes to thank
Benton Hurley and Eliza Stoker for their assistance in preparing this essay for publication.
1. The three Oneida tribes are the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin, the Oneida Indian Nation
of New York, and the Oneida Nation of the Thames (Ontario). I use the term "Oneida"
inclusively to designate all Oneida groups party to a particular claim, and "Wisconsin Oneida"
(or "New York Oneida") to designate that particular group when they acted separately from the
others. In the ICC cases that relate to Wisconsin exclusively, "Oneidas" refers to the Wisconsin
Oneidas only. Canadian tribes could not bring claims before the ICC.
2. See, e.g., Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. United States, 41 Indian Cl. Comm'n 391 (1978);
Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. United States, 26 Indian Cl. Comm'n 138 (1971); Six Nations v.
United States, 23 Indian Cl. Comm'n 375 (1970); Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. United
States, 12 Indian Cl. Comm'n 1 (1962); Emigrant N.Y. Indians v. United States, 5 Indian CI.
Comm'n 560 (1957). ICC decisions are available online at Indian Claims Commission
Decisions, http://digital.library.okstate.edu/icc/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
3. MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF GERONIMO VS. THE
UNITED STATES 233-34 (1997).
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between the Oneidas' ICC suits and their landmark land claims in the federal
courts.4
H. "Finally ": The Origin and Purpose(s) of the Indian Claims Commission
According to Harvey D. Rosenthal, formerly the official historian of the
ICC, the Commission was created by Congress in 1946 "to dealfinally with
the long-standing claims of Native Americans against the Federal
Government."5 Rosenthal's italics signal that this "finally" was understood
differently by distinct constituencies that supported the ICC's creation. The
ICC's first supporters partook of a backward-looking regret for past wrongs,
now to be rectified belatedly. But they were joined by others who looked
forward to an ultimate reckoning as a way to hasten the dissolution of Indian
identities. The Commission's mandate thus encompassed disparate and
contradictory rationales; nevertheless, this linguistic pliability was a necessary
condition of the Commission's creation in a democratic political system.6
The initial momentum behind the idea of a commission came from a new
generation of bureaucrats who had been brought to Washington by Franklin
D. Roosevelt. Men like Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and his
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, demonstrated a high degree of
interest in and respect for Native American cultures compared to most of their
predecessors (and many of their successors as well). Recognizing the inherent
injustice of the legal predicament of Native Americans, the policies they
crafted, collectively dubbed the "Indian New Deal," militated for the
strengthening of tribal structures.7
Indian tribes had longstanding grievances involving their treaties, but had
no access to the federal courts until 1875.8 Even after that, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity precluded suits against the United States unless the
plaintiff successfully undertook the burdensome task of obtaining special
enabling legislation from Congress. Legal action against states was inhibited
4. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145 (1988).
5. IMRE SUTTON, IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 35
(1985).
6. HARVEY D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS
COMMISSION 73 (1990).
7. See GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934-45, at 17-18 (1980).




by the Eleventh Amendment, and local hostility compromised Indians' ability
to obtain redress in state courts.9 Indians were caught in a legal tangle. In
1916, the federal government intervened in one notable case - United States
v. Boylan - to defend land rights of the New York Oneidas, but declined to
take further action.1°
Adjudication of such claims in the federal courts became less viable over
time, in part because Native Americans were disadvantaged by poverty and
unfamiliarity with the legal system. Through the 1920s, they filed increasing
numbers of requests for legislation permitting their claims to proceed.
Although some of these requests were granted, dealing with the requests drew
significant resources from the government." As a result, various proposals
were made for the airing and adjudication of Indian claims, including, most
notably, the 1928 Meriam Report.
2
The proposals languished. Although some of the delay was undoubtedly
related to the Great Depression and World War H, lack of action could also be
attributed to policymakers who feared the consequences of the United States
being subject to potentially staggering liability under any circumstances.
Thus, legislators and bureaucrats closely scrutinized and criticized any
proposed entity for the adjudication of claims. The process eventually moved
forward, but not because of the adoption by growing numbers of an
"enlightened" attitude toward Indian rights, or the creation of a viable plan for
the Commission.
Instead, congressional approval was the product of increasing support for
a new, assimilationist Indian policy known as termination. Termination
promised to definitively end relations between the government and Native
Americans. For proponents of termination, including President Truman, the
ICC was viewed as an opportunity to discharge any lingering, residual debts,
9. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
753, 769-71 (1992); Ward Churchill, Charades, Anyone? The Indian Claims Commission in
Context, 24 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 47 (2000); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term -
Indian Land Claims, supra note 8, at 260; John Eduard Barry, Oneida Indian Nation v. County
of Oneida: Tribal Rights ofAction and the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1852, 1858-60 (1984).
10. United States v. Boylan, 256 F. 468 (N.D.N.Y. 1919), aff'd 265 F. 165 (2d Cir. 1920),
appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 641 (1921); ANTHONY WONDERLEY, ONEIDA IROQUOIS FOLKLORE,
MYTH, AND HISTORY: NEW YORK ORAL NARRATIVE FROM THE NOTES OF H.E. ALLEN AND
OTHERS 192-210 (2004); John Tahsuda, The Oneida Land Claim: Yesterday and Today, 46
BUFFALO L. REV. 1001, 1003-05 (1998).
11. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 18-19; see LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 53-57.
12. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 52; LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION (1928).
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thereby ensuring that when the government closed the books on its relations
with Indians, they would stay closed. 3
Taking a wider perspective, Ward Churchill has argued that the United
States took up the matter of Indian claims to burnish its international image in
the run-up to the Nuremberg trials. 4 Certainly the treatment of minorities
became a more sensitive subject during the Cold War, and the ICC could be
useful to deflect criticism. 5 Embraced by very different constituencies with
very different goals, the ICC represented simultaneously the last major
initiative of the Indian New Deal and the first of the Termination Era. 6
III. Docket 75: The Wisconsin Land Claim
The first disposal of a Wisconsin Oneida case came in 1962. The
Wisconsin Oneidas and Stockbridge-Munsees were co-plaintiffs (under the
umbrella moniker "Emigrant New York Indians") in a land claim related to
their settlement in Wisconsin (then Michigan Territory). 7 In 1822, two
Oneidas of the First Christian party and several Stockbridges, led by the
Oneidas' St. Regis Mohawk missionary, Eleazer Williams, entered into a
treaty with Menominees for rights to settle on their land.' 8 Backed by western
New York land speculators, Williams's goal was to secure a western home for
all the Indians of upstate New York."'
The representatives on both sides who negotiated the cession had highly
dubious authority to do so; nevertheless, according to a treaty signed on Sept.
23, 1822, the "New York Indians" acquired the right to cohabitate with the
Menominees on a tract of land that was eventually fixed at 3,931,000 acres.20
President Monroe gave his approval to this treaty in March of 1823 .21
13. See Churchill, supra note 9, at 52-53; LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 60-61; William
T. Hagan, "To Correct Certain Evils ": The Indian Land Claims Cases, in IROQUOIS LAND
CLAIMS 20 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. Starna eds., 1988). On the Oneidas of
Wisconsin, see Laurence M. Hauptman, Learning the Lessons of History: The Oneidas of
Wisconsin Reject Termination, 1943-1956, 14 J. ETHNIC STUD. 31-52 (1986).
14. See Churchill, supra note 9, at 51-52.
15. LAURENCE M. HAuPTMAN, THE IROQUOIS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: WORLD WAR II
TO RED POWER 190 (1986).
16. JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE" A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 89-91 (1994); see LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 60-61.
17. Emigrant N.Y. Indians v. United States, 5 Indian Cl. Comm'n 560 (1957).
18. Id. at 569-75.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 572-74.




However, amidst complaints from the Menominees, a brewing war with the
Winnebagos, and an emerging policy to move all the natives beyond the
Mississippi, the federal government quickly backtracked on its recognition of
the New York Indians' claims to Wisconsin lands. By the Stambaugh treaty
signed in 1831, the federal government reduced the New York Indian acreage
to 569,120, with provisions to reduce it further if more Indians did not
emigrate from New York.22 In the supplementary treaty of Oct. 27, 1832, the
New York Indians agreed to this simply to secure some guaranteed land base
after years of uncertainty.23 Ultimately, through the treaty signed at
Washington on Feb. 3, 1838, Oneidas residing at Duck Creek near Green Bay
agreed to receive a reservation of just one hundred acres per capita." As a
result, a reservation was created for them amounting to 65,000 acres.25
The legitimacy of the treaty of September 23, 1822, between the 'Emigrant
Indians' and the Menominees was problematic, but the Commission deemed
that its mandate was only to look into whether the federal government "acted
properly in its course of dealings with plaintiffs., 26 In 1957, the three
commissioners, Arthur Watkins, T. Harold Scott, and William Holt,
determined that it had not. Despite its initial recognition of the 1822
proceedings, in subsequent treaties, the U.S. failed to acknowledge the New
York Indians as co-holders of aboriginal title to lands in Wisconsin, and
permitted the "New York Indians" to be railroaded into accepting a smaller
tract.27 Thus, the federal government was now responsible to the "New York
Indians" for their half-interest in the nearly four million acres (minus whatever
lands had in fact been secured to them). In 1962, the Commission issued an
opinion that, based upon a valuation of land at eighty cents per acre in 1832,
the Oneida of Wisconsin and the Stockbridge-Munsee were owed the sum of
$1,488,629.60.28
22. Treaty with the Menominee, Feb. 8, 1831, 7 Stat. 342; Treaty with the Menominee,
Feb. 17, 1831, 7 Stat. 346.
23. Treaty with the Menominee, Oct. 27, 1832, 7 Stat. 405; Appendix to Treaty with the
Menominee, Oct. 27, 1832,7 Stat. 409; Emigrant N. Y Indians, 5 Indian Cl. Comm'n at 603-04.
24. Treaty with the Oneidas, Feb. 3, 1838, 7 Stat. 566, art. 2.
25. The Oneidas filed an ICC claim that they had not received the correct acreage.
However, since the extent of land they did receive was considered an offset against their award
in this case, the claim was dismissed. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. United States, 18
Indian Cl. Comm'n 433, 433 (1967).
26. Emigrant N.Y. Indians v. United States, 5 Indian Cl. Comm'n 607, 621 (1957).
27. Id. at 625.
28. Emigrant N.Y. Indians v. United States, 11 Indian Cl. Comm'n 359, 385-86 (1962).
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In 1964, the Commission ordered the correction of a computing error,
which reduced the award to $1,452,824.29 The award was reduced by another
$139,351 due to the court's practice of allowing the defendant to deduct
"gratuitous offsets." 3° These offsets represented monies spent by the federal
government for tribal benefit even if they had not been disbursed in connection
with the transactions in question. Against the award the government
claimed - and the Commission allowed - sums as small as $40 expended for
funerals for indigent Indians in 1936. 3" While the offsets included agricultural
equipment, the bulk ($128,249.57) was for purchases or grants of land. The
total final award in 1964 was $1,313,472.65.32 Of this, the Oneidas' share,
which was not appropriated until 1967, was $1,171,248.33
ICC land claim awards were based solely upon the difference between what
the Indians had been paid and "fair market value" of the land at the time of
purchase.34 By not adjusting the award to compensate for over 150 years of
inflation, the ICC gave the government an additional benefit by allowing
payment of the judgment in twentieth-century dollars.
The Commission also adhered to the "no-interest rule" that applies to
federal liability, taking the position that absent specific congressional
authorization, it was unable to award interest.35 But in adhering to the "no-
interest rule", the ICC (and Congress) were not simply bowing to precedent:
Application of the no-interest rule protected the treasury from awards that were
large but justifiable. Given the fact that the Indians had been prevented from
filing suit for so long, time and the no-interest rule essentially nullified awards.
IV. Docket 159: The Timber Stripping Claim
From the creation of the Duck Creek reservation in 1838, timber had been
cut and sold off by individual tribal members, effectively denuding the forest
on the 65,000-acre tract. Occasional Oneida requests for intervention led the
federal agent to occasionally request individual Oneidas to stop, but no firm
29. Emigrant N.Y. Indians v. United States, 13 Indian C1. Comm'n 560, 573-a, 573-b
(1964).
30. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 29-31, on the history of this practice prior to its
adoption by the ICC.
31. Emigrant N. Y Indians, 13 Indian C1. Comm'n at 562.
32. Emigrant N.Y Indians, 13 Indian C1. Comm'n at 573-c.
33. Loretta Metoxen, "The New York Emigrant Claim and What We Did With It, " in F.Y.I.
NEW YORK LAND CLAIMs, ONEIDA LAND CLAIMs COMMISSION (Oneida, Wis., n.d.).
34. See Newton, supra note 9, at 820.
35. See id. at 820-21.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol32/iss2/6
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action was taken prior to 1870. At that time, suits were initiated against
purchasers, compensation of about one thousand dollars secured, and
unauthorized lumbering ended.36
Although the commissioners found that "the timber on the reservation was
tribal property" and as such "could not be disposed of without the approval of
the Government," they did not grant the Oneidas relief.37 The ICC cited the
Oneidas' lack of "clean hands' 38 since the cutting and sale of the timber had
been effected by individual Oneidas and countenanced by some of their chiefs.
Although the federal Indian agent to the Oneidas had knowledge of the
removal of the timber, he had not played an active role in the mismanagement
of the reservation's timber resources. The absence of active involvement on
the part of the agent distinguished this case from the successful Wisconsin
timber case won by the Menominees before the Court of Claims in 1950.39
Once again taking a narrow view of the federal trust responsibility, the
commissioners denied that the guardian-ward relationship implied a duty to
intervene to protect reservation resources, because no such obligation was
specified in the treaty that created the reservation.4°
On appeal, the Court of Claims rejected the Commission's opinion that the
government had no responsibility to protect the Oneida timber.4 However, the
court let stand the Commission's decision on the grounds that the
government's responsibility had been fulfilled (albeit minimally) by whatever
actions the agent had taken.42
V. Docket 344: The Pennsylvania Land Claim
The Wisconsin Oneidas were a party to a claim filed by the Six Nations
collectively, challenging the acquisition from them of roughly the
northwestern third of Pennsylvania in 1784, as well as the Erie Triangle in
1789. It was dismissed unanimously in 1963 by the same three commissioners
36. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. United States, 12 Indian Cl. Comm'n 1,2-5 (1962);
United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1873); E.E. Bolles Wooden Ware Co. v. United
States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882).
37. Oneida Tribe, 12 Indian Cl. Comm'n at 2.
38. Id. at 20.
39. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 232 (1941); see LIEDER &
PAGE, supra note 3, at 232-33.
40. Commissioner T. Harold Scott differed from his colleagues on this point, stating that
there were instances in which such a relationship existed absent specific language, although he
did not say this was one of those instances. Oneida Tribe, 12 Indian Cl. Comm'n at 23.
41. Oneida Tribe, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, 493-94 (1964).
42. Id. at 494-500.
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who had decided the previous two cases. At the heart of the Commission's
reasoning for the dismissal was the relationship between the United States and
Pennsylvania under the Articles of Confederation. The ICC was authorized
to hear claims against the federal government, but the treaties under which the
Six Nations lost these lands were signed with the state of Pennsylvania.
The power of Congress over Indian Affairs under the Articles of
Confederation was poorly defined. Article IX granted Congress the power to
"regulat[e] the trade and manag[e] all affairs with the Indians, not members of
any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within its own
limits be not infringed or violated."' 3 According to James Madison, Article IX
was "obscure and contradictory," and the definition of "Indians not members
of any of the States" remained "a question of frequent perplexity and
contention in the federal councils.""
The Commission narrowly interpreted the power of the federal government
to regulate Indian affairs under Article IX; it held that an official of the federal
government would have violated the Article by offering the Indians advice in
their land negotiations with a state.45 The Commission reasoned that because
the United States was barred from playing any role in the treaty, it could not
be liable for its outcome. The claim to the area encompassed by
Pennsylvania's charter boundaries that was ceded in 1784 was therefore
dismissed.
Another issue that arose during the Confederation period involved
definitions of the geographical boundaries of the states. Surveys in 1786 and
1787 revealed that Pennsylvania had only a few miles of frontage on Lake
Erie.' New York and Massachusetts had already relinquished their competing
claims in the area, so the property reverted to the federal government.
Pennsylvania promptly undertook to purchase the Indian title to what became
known as the Erie Triangle in 1789.
Although circumstances therefore differed from the 1784 purchase, the
Commission dismissed the Six Nations' claim to the Erie Triangle on the
grounds that they had not established exclusive use or occupancy over the
area. In the Commission's Eurocentric view, occupancy was defined as more
43. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S.); Six Nations v. United States, 12 Indian
CI. Comm'n 98, 118 (1963).
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 236 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., Albert, Scott & Co.
1894).
45. Six Nations, 12 Indian CI. Comm'n at 118.




or less synonymous with village location.47 Absent the tribe's ability to
establish proof of fixed residence in the area, the claim did not proceed."'
The Six Nations then appealed to the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims
focused more on the 1784 U.S. Treaty of Fort Stanwix than the Articles of
Confederation.4 ' The court affirmed the Commission's decision, and denied
the appellants' contention that the treaty created a fiduciary relationship
between the central government and the Six Nations as a whole. 0 The court
held that "the most significant part of the treaty was merely a peace
pact .... 51s However, the court left open the possibility that the treaty might
operate differently upon the "friendly tribes" referred to in Article Two of that
treaty, which read, "The Oneida and Tuscarora nations shall be secured in the
possession of the lands on which they are settled." 2 Furthermore, the court
stated, "If this separate provision is thought to have had greater meaning for
these friendly tribes, it is enough to note that the lands on which they were
settled did not include the Pennsylvania territory with which this case is
concerned." ' Thus, the adverse decision in docket 344 did not preclude a
different outcome for the Oneidas' claims to lands in New York.
VI. Docket 84: The Accounting Claim
Another claim originating in the eighteenth century was an accounting
claim that the Oneidas mounted in conjunction with the rest of the Six Nations
and Stockbridge-Munsee. The Six Nations were parties to an agreement with
the United States in 1792 and to the Treaty of Canandaigua in 1794. The
United States entered into these agreements as part of an effort to win political
support during a faltering Indian war in the west. On March 23, 1792, with a
delegation of the Six Nations visiting Philadelphia, the president arranged an
annual payment to them of $1500 for "clothing, domestic animals and
implements of husbandry, and for encouraging useful artificers to reside in
their villages." The Senate gave its advice and consent, and the president
ratified, but the stipulation was never fulfilled until it was superseded by the
47. Six Nations, 12 Indian CI. Comm'n at 120-2 1.
48. Id. at 119-21.
49. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
50. Six Nations v. United States, 173 Ct. CI. 899, 906-07 (1965).
51. Id. at 906.
52. Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15, art. 2.
53. Six Nations, 173 Ct. CI. at 899 n.6.
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1794 Treaty of Canandaigua. The Canandaigua treaty promised a $4500
annual disbursement for similar purposes.'
The ICC found that the monies spent on the conversion of the Indians to
European-style agrarianism fell $32,218 shy of the total $711,000 to which the
treaty entitled them up to 1952." The $4500 never paid under the 1792 article
raised the total sum owed the Indians to $36,718.56 As in the other claims, this
small sum might have appropriately been magnified to reflect their loss
through the application of compounding interest. However, the timing of the
underpayments was not addressed and the no-interest rule was again invoked.57
Gratuitous offsets were also applied. The Commission reduced the award
by $5,340.17 because the government had paid the expenses of various Six
Nations delegations between the years 1842 and 1905; the Commission also
deducted $1,448 paid for flour and beef for Stockbridge-Munsee Indians in
1865. Not all offsets presented by the government were allowed.
Disbursements benefitting individual tribal members, such as expenditures for
orphans, were rejected. Expenses paid for tribal delegations disputing
improperly negotiated treaties were also rejected. In seeking to limit the
award, the federal government presented sums as small as $86.65 expenditure
in 1942 to investigate marl deposits on a reservation. That expense, at least,
was rejected because its benefit to the tribe was unknown.
5 8
In 1973, after deducting offsets, the Commission awarded the Six Nations
and Stockbridge-Munsee $29,930.s9 Although the sum was trivial, the
proceeding at least recognized the ongoing obligations imposed by the Treaty
of Canandaigua, which is a touchstone of Iroquois sovereignty vis-i-vis the
United States.
VII. Docket 301: The New York Land Claim
A. Pre-1790 Claims
In 1951, the Oneidas of Wisconsin, New York, and Canada filed a claim for
approximately six million acres taken in treaties with New York State between
54. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 225, 229 (Washington, D.C., Gales &
Seaton, 1832); Six Nations v. United States, 23 Indian Cl. Comm'n 387, 390-92 (1970); Treaty
with the Six Nations, art. 6, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
55. Six Nations, 23 Indian Cl. Comm'n at 392-95.
56. Id. at 391,400.
57. Id. at 396.
58. Six Nations v. United States, 32 Indian CI. Comn'n 440, 440-52 (1973).




1785 and 1846. The first decision was not handed down until 1969, after the
United States sought partial summary judgment. On the basis of its appellate
victory in the Pennsylvania claim discussed above, the United States had
requested the dismissal of those Oneida claims preceding passage of the Trade
and Intercourse Act in 1790.60 These happened to be the treaties of greatest
consequence to the Oneidas, since more than ninety percent of their land at the
end of the Revolution was ceded in treaties at Fort Herkimer in 1785 and Fort
Schuyler in 1788. If the United States succeeded in removing these treaties
from litigation, the Oneida claim would be reduced to roughly 250,000 acres.
The Commission rejected the government's motion for summary judgment.
Commissioners Margaret Pierce, John Vance, Richard Yarborough, and
Theodore McKeldin, distinguished this case from the Pennsylvania claim.
They stressed the difference between the Oneidas' relationship with the United
States and that of the Six Nations as a whole (the Pennsylvania plaintiff) at the
end of the Revolutionary War.6' In light of the Oneidas' fidelity to the United
States and ample contemporaneous congressional recognition thereof, the ICC
held that Congress intended to deal with them differently, and that Article Two
of the Fort Stanwix Treaty had indeed created a special relationship. The
federal government thus could be held liable because it failed to uphold its
treaty commitment to its former allies that they "be secured in the possession
of the lands on which they are settled.,
62
The majority of the Commission did not share their predecessors' opinion
that addressing the Oneidas' dealings with a state would violate the Articles
of Confederation. In arriving at their own conclusion, the Commission
invoked its power to provide relief for "claims based upon fair and honorable
dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity."63 The
Commission had the authority to consider moral claims,' but in keeping with
the court format to which it adhered, it generally limited itself to legal ones
involving land or money. In the absence of a more specific legal rationale, the
most consistently pro-government commissioner, Jerome Kuykendall,
dissented.65
60. Oneida Nation v. United States, 20 Indian Cl. Comm'n 337 (1969).
61. Id. at 349-50. Theodore McKeldin served only temporarily and was replaced by
Brantley Blue in May 1969.
62. Id. at 341-42; Treaty with the Six Nations, art. 2, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
63. Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. United States, 26 Indian CI. Comm'n 583, 585-89, 624
(1971); Indian Claims Commission Act, § 2,60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (1946).
64. See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 66-67, 201; SurrON, supra note 5, at 45.
65. Oneida Nation, 20 Indian Cl. Comm'n at 351; Oneida Nation, 26 Indian CI. Comm'n
at 591; LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 205.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
In its 1976 opinion, the Commission found that the 1785 and 1788 treaties
had been improperly negotiated by New York State. With respect to the first
transaction, the Commission observed that "the Oneidas did not voluntarily
part with their land .... They sold their land only in the face of unwarranted
accusations and threats by Governor Clinton .... Under these circumstances
the Oneidas had no choice but to sell the land which New York desired.
66
The 1788 treaty was similarly problematic. According to the opinion, "the
Oneidas did not voluntarily sell their lands at the Fort Schuyler treaty. In fact,
it is clear from the evidence that the Oneidas did not even realize they were
selling anything. 67 The Commission concluded that
Both the 1785 and 1788 treaties were the type of transaction against
which the United States had promised to protect the Oneidas. The
evidence shows clearly, however, that the United States took no
action to protect the Oneidas with regard to either of the treaties.68
The Commission further concluded that the United States was aware of the
transactions and that its intervention was not prohibited by the Articles of
Confederation. 69 To reach the latter conclusion, the Commission was forced
to explore the ambiguous language of Article IX.7" In the Commission's
reading of that article, "the United States was granted the exclusive right to
manage Indian affairs with those Indians which maintained a tribal existence
independent of any state, so long as the United States did not purchase from
any of these tribes land located within the boundaries of any state." The
Commission overruled any inconsistent opinions in an earlier Docket 301
decision and in Docket 344.71 Commissioner Kuykendall again dissented,
challenging the political criteria used to define "Indians, not members of any
of the States." He stated the Commission's conclusions "are too categorical,
are not supported by the historical evidence of record, and have no judicial
support.
7 2
The Court of Claims affirmed the Commission majority in 1978. 73 In its
opinion, it upheld the Commission's finding that Article II of the 1784 Treaty
66. Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. United States, 37 Indian Cl. Comm'n 522, 526 (1976).
67. Id. at 529.
68. Id. at 530.
69. Id. at 535, 546.
70. Id. at 536-46.
71. Oneida Nation, 26 Indian Cl. Comm'n at 583,588; Six Nations, 12 Indian C1. Comm'n
at 86, 118.
72. Oneida Nation, 37 Indian CI. Comm'n at 556 (Kuykendall, Chairman, dissenting).




of Fort Stanwix "incorporate[ed] the frequent pledges of protection made by
the Continental Congress to the Oneidas and Tuscaroras with regard to their
land."74 The Court of Claims also decided that under Article IX of the Articles
of Confederation "the central government may not have been able to forbid the
transactions, [but] the nature of the chicanery practiced upon the Oneidas
suggest that feasible levels of assistance . . . might well have averted the
harm." Federal influence to mitigate the situation at the time was not only
legal under the Articles of Confederation, but required by the Treaty of Fort
Stanwix.75 The United States' liability was thereby affirmed.
B. Post-i 790 Claims
From 1969 onwards, the ICC had considered the pre- and post-1790 claims
separately in light of the Trade and Intercourse Act passed by Congress. The
act stated that "no purchase or grant of lands.., from any Indians or nation or
tribe of Indians... shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same
be made by a treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
constitution .... ,76 Although the Act explicitly established federal authority
over Indian land cessions, the United States argued that this did not necessarily
make it liable for actions in which it was not directly involved, and pointed out
to the Commission the fact that federal representatives had been present at
only two of the twenty-five transactions in question. In a 1971 opinion, the
Commission refused to define the federal government's duty so narrowly. If
the federal government had knowledge of the treaties but did nothing, it could
still be held liable.77 The government also argued that the Act did not apply
to New York as one of the original thirteen states, a position that the
Commission rejected on the basis of its own decision in Seneca 78 as well as the
Supreme Court's in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.79
The United States appealed in the Court of Claims, but without success.
The appellate court reaffirmed the fiduciary relationship between the federal
government and the Indians under the Trade and Intercourse Act. It remanded
the case to the Commission to establish whether or not the federal government
74. Id. at 57-59.
75. Id. at 61-62.
76. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat.
329, 330 (1793), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/native/na025.htm.
The 1793 version of the act was the version in effect in 1795, when the first of the purchases
in question took place.
77. Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. United States, 26 Indian Cl. Comm'n 138, 145-47 (1971).
78. Seneca Nation of Indians v. United States, 20 Indian Ci. Comm'n 177, 182 (1968).
79. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
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had knowledge of each of the treaties in question (and therefore liability for
any deficiencies therein).8" The Commission found in 1978 that the federal
government had actual knowledge of three of the treaties, and constructive
knowledge of the remainder; it was thus liable for any deficiencies in all of
them.8
The Oneidas won sweeping victories before the Commission in its claims
related to New York lands. However, Docket 301 ultimately foundered
because of the paltry compensation available in the absence of interest or any
adjustment for inflation. While the ICC considered the Oneidas' claim, the
federal courts were finally expressly opened to Indian claims by Congress in
1966.82 In 1970, the Oneidas filed a claim against the counties that now sat on
their reservation. (As noted above, a tribal suit against the state was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.) The potential awards in claims in federal court far
exceeded compensation offered by the ICC. Moreover, the ICC offered only
money, while the federal court could potentially return land.83 The early
results were striking, most notably a Supreme Court decision permitting tribes
to initiate land claims in federal court for violations of the Trade and
Intercourse Act.84
Ultimately, under the ICC the United States would not offer the Oneidas an
award exceeding $3.3 million. The Oneidas of New York were willing to
accept the settlement, but the Oneida tribe of Wisconsin tabled it in 1980. The
latter did so primarily out of an ongoing concern that it would compromise
their more recent, more significant suit in federal court. The Wisconsin
Oneidas did not trust their attorney's assurances that acceptance of the award
would not have this effect.85 In 1982, amid continued concern over the
80. United States v. Oneida Nation of N.Y., 477 F.2d 939, 945 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
81. Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. United States, 43 Indian Cl. Comm'n 373, 468 (1978).
82. 28 U.S.C. 1362 (2006).
83. GEORGE C. SHArrucK, THE ONEIDA LAND CLAIMS: A LEGAL HISTORY 10-11 (1991).
The Oneidas did not, however, request the return of land in this suit. They asked for the rental
value of the land lost by a single transaction in 1795 over a two-year period, 1968-1969.
84. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); see Tahsuda, supra
note 10, at 1007.
85. In 1978, the appellate court had rejected the Wisconsin Oneidas' request to postpone
the proceedings because of potential implications for the other claim, as well as their attempt
to dismiss their attorney. Oneida Nation, 217 Ct. Cl. at 50-52, 52 n.5. Also in 1978, the Indian
Claims Commission denied a petition of the counties of Madison and Oneida to intervene in the
Commission proceedings. Oneida Nation of N.Y. v. United States, 41 Indian Cl. Comm'n 391
(1978); see Barry, supra note 9, at 1861 n.68; Telephone Interview with Dr. John E. Powless,
Oneida, Wis. (Aug. 28, 2007); SHATrucK, supra note 83, at 201; Kristina Lyn Ackley, We Are




potential ramifications of the ICC claim in federal court, the Oneidas withdrew
their ICC complaint.86
VIII. FINALLY? The Oneidas and the Legacy of the ICC
So, how far did the wheels ofjustice turn? They certainly did not move full
circle, ushering in "a new era for the American Indian," as the rhetoric at the
Commission's creation promised.87  Legal historian John R. Wunder has
judged the ICC a "miserable failure." 8 Although the Commission had been
authorized to decide claims on moral grounds, by taking on the form of a
court, it usually (but not always) based its decisions on more narrow legal
grounds. Although not negligible, the monetary awards granted the Wisconsin
Oneidas were certainly small. This was a typical outcome. It was a great
irony that a Commission created to identify and redress "unconscionably low"
payments to Indians itself paid awards in dollars that had depreciated over
nearly two centuries.
With a geographically favorable location and careful management by the
tribal government, the Docket 75 claim played a small part in helping the
Wisconsin Oneidas develop their reservation. Unlike many tribes, the
Wisconsin Oneidas prudently devoted only a small portion of the award for
distribution as per capita payments.8 9
Legal critic Vine Deloria's overall assessment of the ICC was not much
more favorable than Wunder's. At most, Deloria observed, the ICC helped
"clear out the underbrush and allow the claims created by the forced political
and economic dependency during the last century to emerge." 90 Docket 301
certainly had this effect: it was abandoned due to the insufficiency of the
proposed settlement, but not before demonstrating the strength of some of the
Oneidas' potential claims. According to George Shattuck, the attorney who
crafted the Oneidas' 1970 suit in federal court, "a generation became
discouraged" over their failure to make headway in the courts since Boylan,
dissertation, University at Buffalo, State University of New York) (on file with author).
86. See Barry, supra note 9, at 1861 n.68; Tahsuda, supra note 10, at 1006 n.22.
87. Quoted in LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 64.
88. See WUNDER, supra note 16, at 114.
89. Fifteen percent of the award was used for the acquisition of land that was subsequently
developed for economic and tribal use. Personal payments were limited to interest derived from
the remainder of the award; the principal and interest remain under the control of a tribal
committee. See Metoxen, supra note 33. On the distribution of ICC awards generally, see
LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 3, at 257-63.
90. VINE DELORtA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE 228 (Univ. of Texas Press 1985) (1974).
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despite continued efforts. The ICC revived them.9 The Oneidas have yet to
recover substantial compensation in the form of money or land via the federal
courts, but the various cases they have filed there makes it obvious that the
ICC did not end their attempts. Clearly, those who wished to see the matter
of Indian claims resolved 'finally" - in either sense - saw their hopes
dashed.
91. Telephone Interview with George Shattuck, Cazenovia, N.Y. (July 15, 2007); see
Ackley, supra note 85, at 118; HAUPTMAN, supra note 15, at 179-203.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol32/iss2/6
